Complaint/Equivalent Pleading Filed - Complaint/Equivalent Pleading June 27, 2024 (2024)

Case

ELSA PALACIOS v. JUAN LUIS CALMENARES AND ALL OTHERS

Jul 05, 2024 |EV - Evictions (Small Claims Docket) |45D09-2407-EV-002740

Case

Vilgar Property Management v. Angela Byrd

Jul 02, 2024 |EV - Evictions (Small Claims Docket) |45D12-2407-EV-002711

Case

Vilgar Property Management v. Natasha Khawaja

Jul 02, 2024 |EV - Evictions (Small Claims Docket) |45D12-2407-EV-002714

Case

1944 Gary, LLC v. Anthonella Wims

Jul 05, 2024 |EV - Evictions (Small Claims Docket) |45D07-2407-EV-002735

Case

MARIO A MENDOZA v. DRUCILLA REYES

Jul 03, 2024 |EV - Evictions (Small Claims Docket) |45D12-2407-EV-002726

Case

Olson Property Services v. Jovan Browner

Jul 02, 2024 |EV - Evictions (Small Claims Docket) |45D12-2407-EV-002716

Case

MARY OKORO v. GLENNIE FOWLER

Jul 03, 2024 |EV - Evictions (Small Claims Docket) |45D12-2407-EV-002727

Case

DAVE KAPL v. CEDRIC DIAMOND + ALL OTHERS

Jul 03, 2024 |EV - Evictions (Small Claims Docket) |45D09-2407-EV-002723

Ruling

HAISH CONTRUCTION CO, INC. V. NATIONAL BUILDERS, INC ET AL

Jul 10, 2024 |23CV01783

23CV01783 HAISH CONTRUCTION CO, INC. V. NATIONAL BUILDERS, INC ET ALEVENT: Default Prove-Up HearingThe Court will execute the proposed Court Judgment by Default, submitted on June 7,2024. No appearances are required.

Ruling

CHARLES D SHEA VS LITO VALES, ET AL.

Jul 09, 2024 |23AVCV00526

Case Number: 23AVCV00526 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: A14 Background This is a quiet action. Plaintiff Charles D. Shea (Plaintiff) presents that the real property at issue is commonly known as 43827 Chaparral Drive, Lancaster, CA 93536 (the Subject Property). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lito Vales (Lito)[1] and Vicki Vales (Vicki and collectively the Vales) took title to the Subject Property from Lancaster Palms, LLC by as joint tenants by way of a Grant Deed recorded on August 18, 2006, as Document No. 06-1842986, that the Vales refinanced the Subject Property numerous times, and the Vales deeded their interest in the Subject Property to Plaintiff as his sole and separate property, by way of a Grant Deed which recorded in on April 16, 2018 as Document No. 20180363739. Plaintiff presents that his spouse, Kim Marie Rosas-Shea, deeded her interest in the Property to Plaintiff by way of an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed (IGD) which recorded in on April 16, 2018 as Document No. 20180363738. Plaintiff further alleges that he obtained a loan in the amount of $244,000.00 from CrossCountry Mortgage, Inc. with MERS as nominee for Lender and Lenders successors and assigns, secured by 43827 Chaparral Drive, Lancaster CA 93536 by way of a deed of trust recorded on April 16, 2018 as Document No. 20180363740. Plaintiff contends that the Vales did not disclose that there was any other prior deed of trust encumbering the Subject Property, but Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS) and its predecessors-in-interest contend that here is a prior deed of trust securing a loan to the Vales in the amount of $58,000.00 from lender Countrywide Bank, N.A. with MERS as nominee for Lender and Lenders successors and assigns, which was recorded on October 23, 2006, as Document No. 06-2340701 with the correct common description of the Subject Property, but incorrect Assessor Parcel Number (APN). Hereinafter, this deed of trust will be addressed as the 2006 DOT. Plaintiff believes that the deed of trust at issue is related to the Vales other property, commonly known as 3523 W Avenue K4, Lancaster, CA 93536. From this deed of trust, Plaintiff alleges that (1) an Assignment of Deed of Trust (as to the 2006 DOT) was recorded on July 18, 2019 as Document No. 20190699535 containing the common property address with the incorrect APN; (2) a second Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded on August 11, 2022 as Document No. 20220810290 containing the common property address with the incorrect APN; (3) on or about January 25, 2023, a Notice of Default pertaining to the Prior DOT was recorded as Document No. 20230050193, containing the correct common address and APN; and (4) on April 28, 2023, a Notice of Trustee Sale pertaining to the Prior DOT was recorded as Document No. 20230276620, containing the correct common address and APN, subsequently occurred, affecting the Subject Property. Plaintiff contends that he is a bone fide purchaser. Plaintiff seeks to quiet title, cancel the 2006 DOT, and declaratory relief. On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging three causes of action for: (1) Quiet Title, (2) Cancellation of Instrument; and (3) Declaratory Relief. On May 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Lis Pendens. On June 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint, amending the fictitious name of Doe 1 to MEB Loan Trust VI (MEB). On July 24, 2023, SLS filed its Answer. On October 20, 2023, MEB filed its Answer. On October 17, 2023, Vicki was placed into default. On November 14, 2023, Lito was placed into default. On February 02, 2024, Plaintiff filed this Motion for Summary Judgment. On February 07, 2024, the parties entered a stipulation to continue the trial date and all discovery deadlines, granted by the Court. On February 08, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application to Continue Trial and Related Dates, set for hearing on February 13, 2024. On February 13, 2024, the Court informed the parties that the stipulation was previously granted on February 07, 2024. The Court did not rule on the Ex Parte Application which appeared to be based on the previously filed stipulation. On June 25, 2025, SLS filed its Opposition. On July 02, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Reply. ----- Legal Standard Standard for Summary Judgment The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Cal. Code Civ. Proc.¿§437c(c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to¿any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿ (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.¿ (Juge¿v. County of Sacramento¿(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67 (Juge), citing¿FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima¿(1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the party moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Cal.¿Code Civ.¿Proc.¿§437c(p)(2);¿Scalf¿v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.¿(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v.¿Paetkau¿(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)¿¿¿ ----- Discussion Application At the crux of Plaintiffs arguments related to the First Cause of Action (Quiet Title) and Second Cause of Action (Cancellation of Instrument) is Plaintiffs assertion that he is a bona fide purchaser. A buyer is a bona fide purchaser if it bought property in good faith, for value, and had no knowledge or notice of the asserted rights of another. (612 South LLC v. Laconic Limited Partnership (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1278; Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1251.) The first element does not require that the buyer's consideration be the fair market value of the property (or anything approaching it). (Citation.) Instead, the buyer need only part with something of value in exchange for the property. (Citation.) (Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1251.) The determination whether a party is a good faith purchaser or encumbrancer for value ordinarily is a question of fact; on appeal, that determination will not be reversed unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence. (Triple A Management Co., Inc. v. Frisone (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 520, 536.) The general rule places the burden of proof upon a person claiming bona fide purchaser status to present evidence that he or she acquired interest in the property without notice of the prior interest. [Citations.] (First Fidelity Thrift & Loan Assn. v. Alliance Bank (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1442.) Here, there is no presentation of what Plaintiff parted with for the Subject Property. Rather, Plaintiff has not only alleged that he was deeded the Subject Property in the Complaint (see Complaint ¶ 11)[2], but also evidenced that it was deeded to him through his attached declaration (see Compendium of Evidence, Tab 11, Decl. of Plaintiff ¶ 3[Defendants Lito Vales and Vicki Vales (collectively, the Vales) transferred the real property commonly known as 43827 Chaparral Drive, Lancaster CA 93536 (the Chaparral Property) to me by way of a Grant Deed which recorded on April 16, 2018 bearing Document No. 20180363739. I am the current owner of the Chaparral Property. A true and correct copy of the Grant Deed is incorporated herein by reference and attached to Compendium of Evidence as Tab 2].) While Plaintiff presents that he paid value for the Subject Property, Plaintiff relies only on: (1) the Grant Deed, and (2) a subsequent loan in the amount of $244,000.00 from CrossCountry Mortgage, Inc. secured by a Deed of Trust. (See Motion for Summary Judgment 6:22-26; Compendium of Evidence, Tab 11, Decl. of Plaintiff ¶ 5.) While Plaintiff states that he pai value for the Subject Property in his declaration (see Compendium of Evidence, Tab 11, Decl. of Plaintiff ¶ 5), what has been presented to the Court is that (1) the Subject Property was deeded to Plaintiff by the Vales (id. at ¶ 3, and Tab 2); (2) Plaintiffs spouse deeded any interest in the Subject Property to him through an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed (id. at ¶ 4, and Tab 3); and (3) a subsequent loan in the amount of $244,000.00 was obtained from CrossCountry Mortgage, Inc. and secured by the Subject Property (id. at ¶ 5, and Tab 4). There has been neither a presentation of evidence that value was exchanged for the Subject Property between the Plaintiff and the previous owners, the Vales nor a foundation laid for a grant deed to qualify as a purchase or exchange of value. Thus, Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that he is a bona fide purchaser and so his arguments for the First Cause of Action (Quiet Title) and Second Cause of Action (Cancellation of Instrument) fail. Plaintiffs argument for the Third Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief) is that it is undisputed that the 2006 DOT was not recorded in the Subject Propertys chain of title giving Plaintiff constructive notice; and (2) Plaintiff purchased the Subject Property without any notice of the existence of the Prior DOT or Defendants claimed interest in the Prior DOT. As discussed, ante, there is an issue as to whether Plaintiff purchased the Subject Property. The Third Cause of Action (Declaratory Relieve) is derivative of Plaintiffs other claims. As Plaintiff has not met his burden for both the First Cause of Action (Quiet Title) and Second Cause of Action (Cancellation of Instrument), the derivative Third Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief) fails. Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED. ----- Conclusion Plaintiff Charles D. Sheas Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Plaintiff Charles D. Sheas Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED. [1] Defendants Lito Vales and Vicki Vales share the same surname. The Court address each individually by their first name for the purpose of clarity. No disrespect is intended. [2] The Complaint itself alleges both that Plaintiff was deeded the Subject Property and that Plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser. (Compare Complaint ¶ 11 with Complaint ¶¶ 22, 28, 39, 41 and Prayer ¶ 2.)

Ruling

Matthew Davies et al. vs Jessica Flores et al.

Jul 10, 2024 |STK-CV-URP-2022-0012043

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Ruling

LIVING THE DREAM VS STEVEN HARGROVE, ET AL.

Jul 09, 2024 |23STCV27404

Case Number: 23STCV27404 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 74 Living the Dream v. Hargrove et al. Defendants / Cross-Complainants Motion for an Order Compelling Plaintiff to Return Cross-Complainants Security Deposit or, Alternatively Deposit It With the Court BACKGROUND Plaintiff Living the Dream, a California Corporation, sued defendants Steven Hargrove and Jessica Hargrove on November 8, 2023, asserting a single cause of action for breach of a written lease. Plaintiff alleges it leased Defendants a property located at 526 Chalette Dr., Beverly Hills, (the Property), for a term of one year beginning May 11, 2023. (Compl., ¶¶ 9-10; Cross-Compl., ¶ 1.) Defendants agreed to pay monthly rent of $39,000.00. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Defendants also posted a security deposit of $117,000. (Id., ¶ 11.) As alleged, Defendants vacated the rented property (Property) in August 2023 and stopped paying rent. (Id., ¶¶ 16-17.) Also, upon retaking possession of the Property, Plaintiff discovered the Property had suffered damage in excess of the $117,000.00 security deposit. (Id., ¶¶ 17-19.) Plaintiff sued. On February 23, 2024, Defendants cross-complained against Plaintiff for (1) breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) constructive eviction, (4) fraud and deceit, (5) negligent misrepresentation, and (6) unlawful retention of a security deposit. Defendants argue Plaintiff misrepresented the Property as a luxury rental with numerous amenities. (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 8-9.) But when Defendants moved in, they discovered many or most of the advertised amenities were not present or not properly maintained. (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 10-19.) The Property also allegedly suffered from susbtandard conditions such as leaky plumbing and exposed electrical wiring. (Ibid.) On May 21, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion for an order compelling Plaintiff to return their security deposit to them or deposit it with the Court. Defendants argue the security deposit was delivered to Plaintiff as trustee and Plaintiffs right to retain it has not been perfected, so it should be returned or deposited pending a dispositive ruling. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed its opposition. On July 1, 2024, Defendants replied. LEGAL STANDARD ¿¿ When it is admitted by the pleadings, or shown upon the examination of a party to the action, that he or she has in his or her possession, or under his or her control, any money or other thing capable of delivery, which, [1] being the subject of litigation, is held by him or her as trustee for another party, or which [2] belongs or which is due to another party or which [3] should, under the circumstances of the case be held by the court pending final disposition of the action, the court may order the same, upon motion, to be deposited in court or delivered to such party, upon those conditions that may be just, subject to the further direction of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 572, bracketed numerals and emphasis added.) DISCUSSION It is undisputed that Plaintiff refused to return Defendants $117,000 security deposit based on the unpaid rent and property damages Plaintiff alleges in its complaint. Defendants argue Plaintiff could have withheld their security deposit on this basis if it had complied with the procedures prescribed in Civil Code section 1950.5. But Plaintiff admits it did not; because it did not, it lost its right to withhold, and it must return the deposit and seek damages independently after it returns Defendants deposit. In opposition, Plaintiff argues Defendants cannot satisfy any of the three disjunctive conditions in Code of Civil Procedure section 572. The Court finds Defendants have satisfied at least the second condition in section 572: that Defendants have demonstrated, or Plaintiffs have conceded, a present right to the security deposit at issue. Defendants have demonstrated, via admissions in Plaintiffs complaint and in its responses to discovery, that Plaintiff failed to comply with Civil Code section 1950.5. Section 1950.5 governs a landlords right to withhold a deposit, which reads (as relevant here): No later than 21 calendar days after the tenant has vacated the premises, ... the landlord shall furnish the tenant, by personal delivery or by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a copy of an itemized statement indicating the basis for, and the amount of, any security received and the disposition of the security, and shall return any remaining portion of the security to the tenant. (Civ. Code, § 1950.5(g)(1).) Plaintiff concedes in its Complaint that it withheld Defendants deposit. (Compl., ¶ 19 [seeking damages less the amount of the security deposit].) In its discovery responses, submitted by Defendants in support of their motion, Plaintiff confirms that it sent them the itemized statement described in section 1950.5 (1950.5 Statement) on September 22, 2023, no less than twenty-two days after Defendants vacated the premises. (See Mot, Exh. C, 4:19-20 [[T]he itemized statement of damages was deposited with the US Postal Service on September 22, 2023.].) If, within the specified period, the landlord has not provided the tenant with a written accounting of the portion of the security deposit he plans to retain, the right to retain all or part of the security deposit under section 1950.5, subdivision (f), has not been perfected, and he must return the entire deposit to the tenant. (Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 745 (Granberry).) Granberry, supra, affirms that a landlord may assert a claim for damages as Plaintiff does here whether or not it withholds a deposit. (Ibid.) But as relevant to this motion, it also holds that the landlord must return the deposit in the interim if he fails to provide a 1950.5 Statement, whether or not he decides to sue. Plaintiff did not provide a timely 1950.5 notice; it must return the deposit, even though it has also sued Defendants. As an evidentiary matter, Plaintiff claims Defendants cannot avail themselves of Code of Civil Procedure section 572 unless they show Plaintiff clearly admitted ... in [its] pleading that Defendants are entitled to the deposit. (Ex parte Elias (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 262, 273.) Not so. Defendants may show either that Plaintiff admitted their right to the deposit in his pleading, or if it has been otherwise shown in some proceeding in the cause[.] (Ibid.) Defendants evidence shows and Plaintiff does not factually contest that Plaintiff did not provide a timely 1950.5 Statement. Although Plaintiff may eventually recover as much as or more than the security deposit in damages, it has forfeited its right to hold the deposit in the interim. Defendants motion is granted. The Court will order Plaintiff to deliver the balance of Defendants deposit to Defendants and/or their counsel within thirty (30) days of this ruling. CONCLUSION Defendants motion is granted. Plaintiff ordered to deliver the balance of the security deposit to Defendants and/or their counsel within thirty (30) days of this ruling. Plaintiff shall give notice.

Ruling

MATTHEW GRAHAM, ET AL. VS KERRI POMAROLLI, ET AL.

Jul 09, 2024 |23TRCV03072

Case Number: 23TRCV03072 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: P Demurrer to Complaint Broker Defendants Demurrer is placed off calendar in light of the Courts ruling on Seller Defendants Petition to Compel Arbitration and the Courts order staying the entire action pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants. On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:& (c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (CCP §1281.2(c).) If the court determines that a party to the arbitration is also a party to litigation in a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party as set forth under subdivision (c), the court (1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order intervention or joinder of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2) may order intervention or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action or special proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the court action or special proceeding. (CCP §1281.2, para. 4.) Seller Defendants are moving to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs claims pursuant to ¶31 of the Purchase Agreement. Broker Defendants are not a party to ¶31 of the Purchase Agreement. (Petition to Compel Arbitration, Ex. 2, ¶31(D)(Agents shall not be obligated nor compelled to mediate or arbitrate unless they agree to do so in writing.) Broker Defendants and Seller Defendants are named as joint tortfeasors in Plaintiffs tort causes of action and as co-defendants in the UCL cause of action. The claims against both Broker and Seller Defendants arise out of the same transaction and events and have overlapping factual and legal issues. Based on these facts, CCP §1281.2(c) applies and the Court has the discretion to choose from several options, including denial of the petition to compel arbitration. Here, it appears every issue of law and fact between Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants overlaps those as to Broker Defendants. There is therefore a danger of conflicting rulings if the Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants in arbitration and Broker Defendants in litigation are allowed to proceed simultaneously. The bulk of the wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint is against Seller Defendants. For these reasons, the Court orders arbitration of Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants and stays the entire action pending completion of the arbitration. As the court has GRANTED Seller Defendants Petition to Compel Arbitration pursuant to CCP §1281.2, the entire action is stayed pursuant to CCP §1281.2(c), para. 4, pending completion of the arbitration of Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants pursuant to ¶31 of the Purchase Agreement. As the entire action is stayed, the court takes the demurrer off calendar until such time as arbitration between the Plaintiffs and the Seller Defendants is completed.*** Motion for Monetary and Non-monetary Sanctions against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs Counsel pursuant to CCP §128.7 The Court considered the moving papers, opposition and reply. RULING Defendants request for CCP §128.7 sanctions is DENIED. Defendants fail to establish compliance with the 21-day safe harbor requirement. Defendants also fail to establish any substantive violation of CCP §128.7. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Matthew Graham and Regan Cole purchased a single family home from Defendants Kerri and Richard Pomarolli (Seller Defendants). Plaintiffs allege Seller Defendants remodeled the property without proper permitting and without a general contractor. Plaintiffs allege Seller Defendants listed the property for sale on May 6, 2022 through Defendants Cory Jane Mishelevich-Birkett and Matilla Realty, Inc. d/b/a ERA Matilla Realty (Broker Defendants). Defendants falsely stated in the listing that the property contained a permitted family room addition. In June 2022, Plaintiffs entered into a residential purchase agreement with Seller Defendants for the property. Plaintiffs allege Seller Defendants made multiple misrepresentations regarding the property in the purchase agreement, as well as in the listing. After purchasing the property, Plaintiffs discovered multiple defects in the home and ultimately discovered that the remodel work was improperly performed and unpermitted. Plaintiffs allege Broker Defendants also made alleged misrepresentations regarding the property. On September 18, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Seller and Broker Defendants alleging (1) fraud; (2) constructive fraud; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) violation of Penal Code §496; (5) negligence; (6) negligence per se; (7) breach of contract; (8) violation of Bus. & Prof. C. §17200, et seq. LEGAL AUTHORITY By presenting to the court, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating, a pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, all of the following conditions are met: (1) It is not being presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. (2) The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. (3) The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. (CCP §128.7(b).) Under section 128.7, a court may impose sanctions if it concludes a pleading was filed for an improper purpose or was indisputably without merit, either legally or factually. [¶] A claim is factually frivolous if it is not well grounded in fact and is legally frivolous if it is not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. In either case, to obtain sanctions, the moving party must show the party's conduct in asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable. A claim is objectively unreasonable if any reasonable attorney would agree that it is totally and completely without merit. (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 189 (CCP 128.7 sanctions properly imposed where it was obvious that plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata, judicial admissions and judicial estoppel).) An action that is not legally or factually frivolous cannot be presented for an improper purpose. Having concluded that the claims presented in the second amended complaint were nonfrivolous, we must also conclude that they were not presented for an improper purpose. (Ponce v. Wells Fargo Bank (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 253, 265.) DISCUSSION Seller Defendants ask that CCP §128.7 sanctions be imposed against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs counsel. Seller Defendants argue the complaint was filed for an improper purpose and to harass them. Seller Defendants argue parties entered into an arbitration agreement that clearly applies to this action. Seller Defendants argue Plaintiffs refused to withdraw their complaint despite knowledge of the applicable arbitration agreement. Seller Defendants ask that the Court impose $9,000 in monetary sanctions and that it strike Plaintiffs complaint and dismiss Seller Defendants from the action. In response, Plaintiffs filed a combined opposition to Seller Defendants Petition to Compel Arbitration and the instant Motion for 128.7 Sanctions. Plaintiffs argue the requested sanctions are excessive. Seller Defendants claim they satisfied the 21-day safe harbor requirement under CCP §128.7(c). However, based on the proof of service, Seller Defendants filed the motion on May 28, 2024, and served it on the same date. Seller Defendants were required to serve the motion at least 21 days before they filed it with the Court. (CCP § 128.7(c)(1) (Notice of motion shall be served as provided in Section 1010, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion&the challenged paper&is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.) Seller Defendants motion must therefore be denied for failure to establish that the 21-day safe harbor requirement was satisfied. Seller Defendants motion also fails substantively. Seller Defendants claim Plaintiffs complaint is frivolous and brought solely to harass them, because there is a clearly applicable arbitration agreement. However, a complaint is not totally and completely without merit merely because the alleged dispute is subject to an arbitration agreement. Even if there is an applicable arbitration agreement, the complaint is not dismissed. If a party successfully compels arbitration, the action would be stayed pending completion of arbitration and upon completion of arbitration, judgment would be entered on the arbitration award. Thus, existence of an applicable arbitration agreement does not affect the meritoriousness of a complaint. In addition, an arbitration agreement can be deemed unenforceable even if it is applicable to the dispute alleged in a complaint. For example, if CCP §1281.2(c) applies, as it does here, a court may decline to enforce an applicable arbitration agreement and force all parties to litigate their claims. In fact, a plaintiff does not waive the right to arbitrate by merely filing a complaint. (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 185.) Thus, arbitration and filing of a complaint are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, a plaintiff may file a complaint in hopes that a defendant chooses not to exercise the right to arbitration. Arbitration can also fail, leading parties to agree to withdraw the matter from arbitration and reinstate the litigation. (See e.g. Titan/Value Equities Group, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 482, 487 (Absent an agreement to withdraw the controversy from arbitration, however, no judicial act is authorized.) For these reasons, Seller Defendants request for CCP §128.7 sanctions is DENIED. Defendants fail to establish compliance with the 21-day safe harbor requirement. Defendants also fail to establish any substantive violation of CCP §128.7. ORDER Seller Defendants request for CCP §128.7 sanctions is DENIED. Seller Defendants fail to establish compliance with the 21-day safe harbor requirement. Seller Defendants also fail to establish any substantive violation of CCP §128.7.*** (1) Petition to Compel Arbitration (2) Motion to Stay Legal Action Pending Arbitration In connection with the Petition to Compel Arbitration, the court considered the moving papers, opposition and reply. In connection with the Motion to Stay, the court considered the moving papers. No opposition or reply papers were filed. RULING Defendants Kerri Pomarolli and Richard S. Pomarollis Petition to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED pursuant to CCP §1281.2. The entire action is stayed pursuant to CCP §1281.2(c), paragraph 4 pending arbitration of Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants. Defendants Kerri Pomarolli and Richard S. Pomarollis Motion to Stay Legal Action Pending Arbitration is GRANTED. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Matthew Graham and Regan Cole purchased a single family home from Defendants Kerri and Richard Pomarolli (Seller Defendants). Plaintiffs allege Seller Defendants remodeled the property without proper permitting and without a general contractor. Plaintiffs allege Seller Defendants listed the property for sale on May 6, 2022 through Defendants Cory Jane Mishelevich-Birkett and Matilla Realty, Inc. d/b/a ERA Matilla Realty (Broker Defendants). Defendants falsely stated in the listing that the property contained a permitted family room addition. In June 2022, Plaintiffs entered into a residential purchase agreement with Seller Defendants for the property. Plaintiffs allege Seller Defendants made multiple misrepresentations regarding the property in the purchase agreement, as well as in the listing. After purchasing the property, Plaintiffs discovered multiple defects in the home and ultimately discovered that the remodel work was improperly performed and unpermitted. On September 18, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Seller and Broker Defendants alleging (1) fraud; (2) constructive fraud; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) violation of Penal Code §496; (5) negligence; (6) negligence per se; (7) breach of contract; (8) violation of Bus. & Prof. C. §17200, et seq. LEGAL AUTHORITY On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement. (c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (CCP §1281.2.) The trial court may resolve motions to compel arbitration in summary proceedings, in which the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination. The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability by a preponderance of the evidence. (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 776 (trial court properly decided plaintiffs challenge to arbitration agreement despite delegation clause where plaintiff attacked contract formation and very existence of agreement to arbitrate).) If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies. (CCP §1281.4 (para. 1).) DISCUSSION I. Petition to Compel Arbitration A. Seller Defendants Establish an Applicable Arbitration Agreement and Plaintiffs Fail to Raise any Defense Seller Defendants move to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause contained in the parties residential purchase agreement (Purchase Agreement). (Motion, Ex. 2.) Paragraph 31 of the Purchase Agreement states, [t]he Parties agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration&The arbitration shall be conduct through any arbitration provider or service mutually agreed to by the Parties&. (Motion, Ex. 2, ¶31.) Plaintiffs claims undoubtedly arise out of the Purchase Agreement, as the complaint is based entirely on the misrepresentations made in the Purchase Agreement itself and in connection with Defendants sale of the property. (FAC, ¶¶24-40.) Seller Defendants therefore establish the existence of an applicable arbitration agreement to Plaintiffs dispute. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the arbitration agreement applies to their dispute. In response, Plaintiffs argue Seller Defendants failed to satisfy the condition precedent of selecting an arbitrator mutually agreed to by Plaintiffs and Seller Defendants and have thus waived their right to arbitrate. B. The Contract Does Not Contain a Condition Precedent A condition is an event which must occur or be excused before performance on a contract becomes due. Conditions precedent are not favored and contractual provisions will not be so construed in the absence of language plainly requiring such a construction. (In re Marriage of Hasso (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1181.) There is no language in ¶31 that would make the obligation to arbitrate contingent upon first selecting an arbitrator, e.g. subject to or conditioned on. Plaintiffs fail to point to any such language. Absent plain language requiring that parties first appoint a mutually agreeable arbitrator prior to complying with their obligation to arbitrate, the Court will not construe paragraph 31 as imposing such a condition precedent on the parties obligation to arbitrate. The Court rejects Plaintiffs contention that their obligation to arbitrate was contingent upon selection of a mutually agreeable arbitrator. C. Defendants Have Not Waived Their Right to Arbitration In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue Seller Defendants have waived any right to compel arbitration by refusing to name an acceptable arbitrator. A party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence any fact necessary to its defense. (Olvera v. El Pollo Loco, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 447, 453.) As the party asserting waiver, Plaintiff bears the heavy burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence any fact necessary to its defense. (St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) While there is no single test for establishing waiver, the relevant factors include: (1) whether the party's actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked and the parties were well into preparation of a lawsuit before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) whether important intervening steps (e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration) had taken place; and (5) whether the delay affected, misled, or prejudiced the opposing party. (Saint Agnes Med. Ctr., supra, 31 Cal.4th at 1203.) The presence or absence of prejudice from the litigation is a determinative issue. (Id. at 12031204.) Any claim that the right to arbitration has been waived is reviewed with close judicial scrutiny. (Id. at 1195.) Although a court may deny a petition to compel arbitration on the ground of waiver (§ 1281.2, subd. (a)), waivers are not to be lightly inferred and the party seeking to establish a waiver bears a heavy burden of proof. (Id.) Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. (Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 320.) Plaintiffs fail to carry the heavy burden of establishing waiver. Seller Defendants were under no obligation to name an acceptable arbitrator prior to exercising their right to demand arbitration. Plaintiffs fail to articulate how the failure to name an arbitrator during the parties discussions qualifies as waiver of the right to arbitrate. Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to cite to specific evidence of Seller Defendants absolute refusal to participate in the process to select a mutually agreed upon arbitrator. Given Plaintiffs refusal to voluntarily participate in arbitration, Seller Defendants understandably chose to obtain an order compelling arbitration before attempting to select a mutually agreeable arbitrator. Plaintiffs raise no other arguments in opposition to the request to compel arbitration. Defendants have established an applicable arbitration agreement and Plaintiffs have failed to raise any defense to arbitration. Therefore, the motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. II. Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies&If the issue which is the controversy subject to arbitration is severable, the stay may be with respect to that issue only. Seller Defendants also filed a separate motion to stay the action against them pending completion of arbitration pursuant to 1281.4. In light of the Courts order granting the petition to compel arbitration and staying the action pursuant to CCP §1281.2(c), Seller Defendants request to stay this action pending arbitration is GRANTED for those reasons. III. Selection of Neutral Arbitrator Should parties reach an impasse in selecting a neutral arbitrator, they may petition the Court to appoint the arbitrator pursuant to CCP §1281.6. If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointing an arbitrator, that method shall be followed. If the arbitration agreement does not provide a method for appointing an arbitrator, the parties to the agreement who seek arbitration and against whom arbitration is sought may agree on a method of appointing an arbitrator and that method shall be followed. In the absence of an agreed method, or if the agreed method fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an arbitrator appointed fails to act and his or her successor has not been appointed, the court, on petition of a party to the arbitration agreement, shall appoint the arbitrator. ORDER Defendants Kerri Pomarolli and Richard S. Pomarollis Petition to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED pursuant to CCP §1281.2. The entire action is stayed pending arbitration of Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants. Defendants Kerri Pomarolli and Richard S. Pomarollis Motion to Stay Legal Action Pending Arbitration is GRANTED.

Ruling

ANDERSON vs SUPERIOR LOAN SERVICING

Jul 11, 2024 |CVRI2304826

Motion to Vacate and Set Aside DefaultANDERSON vs SUPERIORCVRI2304826 and for Leave to File ResponsiveLOAN SERVICINGPleading by SERGEI SHARAPOVTentative Ruling:The Motion to Set Aside the Default was filed on 5/13/2024. The attached proof of serviceindicates service by regular mail on 5/8/2024. No timely opposition has been filed (CCP 1005).Accordingly, the Motion to Set Aside the Default entered on 11/30/2023 as to Defendant SergeiSharapov is set aside. The Court sets the matter for a Case Management Conference on9/12/2024 at 8:30 in Department 6. Defendant to file a responsive pleading. The OSC re: Failureto file a Default Judgment per CRC 3.110(h) is vacated.

Ruling

SMBD INVESENTS, LP, A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP VS COCO'S RESTAURANTS, LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.

Jul 10, 2024 |23TRCV01708

Case Number: 23TRCV01708 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B SMBD INVESTMENTS, LP, Plaintiff, Case No.: 23TRCV01708 vs. [Tentative] RULING COCOS RESTAURANTS, LLC, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Moving Parties: Attorney Phillip Allan Trajan Perez and Benjamin P. Tarczy at Miller Nash LP, attorney for defendants Responding Party: None Motions to Be Relieved as Counsel The Court considered the moving papers. RULING The motions are GRANTED. The Court orders that the attorney is relieved as counsel of record for defendants, effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed Order Granting Attorneys Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel Civil (Judicial Council form MC-053) upon the clients. BACKGROUND On May 30, 2023, plaintiff SMBD Investments, LP filed a complaint against Cocos Restaurants, LLC, Sharis Management Corporation, and Fri-M, LLC for breach of lease and account stated. On August 7, 2023, defendants filed an answer. LEGAL STANDARD The court has discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw, and such a motion should be granted provided that there is no prejudice to the client and it does not disrupt the orderly process of justice. See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal. App. 4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal. App. 2d 398. CRC Rule 3.1362 (Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel) requires (1) notice of motion and motion to be directed to the client (made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-051)); (2) a declaration stating in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) (made on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-052)); (3) service of the notice of motion and motion and declaration on all other parties who have appeared in the case; and (4) the proposed order relieving counsel (prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-053)). DISCUSSION Defendants attorneys, Phillip Allan Trajan Perez and Benjamin P. Tarczy at Miller Nash LP seek to be relieved as counsel. Counsel Tarczy states in his declaration that defendants have not complied with their engagement agreement with Miller Nash LP by failing to pay outstanding attorneys fees and costs it has incurred. Starting in August 2023, counsel has made several requests that defendants become current on their outstanding fees and costs. Counsel also states that defendants have consented to Miller Nash LPs withdrawal as counsel but have not found new counsel. The Court finds that the attorney submitted a declaration establishing that the service requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1362, have been satisfied. The Court also finds that the attorney has shown sufficient reason why the motion to be relieved as counsel should be granted. The motion is GRANTED. ORDER The motion is GRANTED. The Court orders that the attorney is relieved as counsel of record for defendants, effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed Order Granting Attorneys Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel Civil (Judicial Council form MC-053) upon the clients. Moving counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Ruling

CLEARVIEW REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC VS SOCIETY VENTURES LLC, ET AL.

Jul 09, 2024 |24AVCV00237

Case Number: 24AVCV00237 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: A14 Background This is a quiet title action. Plaintiff Clearview Real Estate Holdings, LLC (Plaintiff) alleges presents that the real property at issue is commonly known as 1741 Viridian Ave., Lancaster, CA 93534 and provides the legal description in Exhibit A of the Complaint (the Subject Property). Plaintiff further presents that it is the current and true legal and equitable titleholder to the Subject Property by way of a perfected and duly recorded trustees deed upon sale; Defendant Amir Aki Shaheed-Edwards (Shaheed-Edwards) is the former borrower under that certain deed of trust dated September 16, 2019, and recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document Number 20190977291 and has no valid right, title, lien, or interest in the Subject Property; and that Defendant Society Ventures LLC (Society Ventures) claims to have a lien interest in the Subject Property through the fraudulent use of a UCC Financing Statement recorded against the Subject Property which was recorded as Document Number 20230558836 on or about August 22, 2023, but has no valid right to title, lien or interest in the Subject Property as UCC Financing Statement cannot create a security interest in real property. Plaintiff seeks to quiet title and cancel clouds on title on the Subject Property. On February 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed its Complaint alleging three causes of action for: (1) Quiet Title, (2) Cancellation of Instrument, and (3) Slander of Title. On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint, amending the fictitious name of Doe 1 to Diane Merritt and a Notice of Lis Pendens. On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint, amending the fictitious name of Doe 2 to Amir Aki Shaheed-Edwards dba Bait Califa Trust. On April 02, 2024, Society Ventures filed a Request to Waive Court Fees, subsequently denied. On April 05, 2024, Society Ventures filed a Motion to Quash Service. The Motion to Quash Service was voided on May 07, 2024 as Society Ventures, a corporation, was trying to proceed in pro per with an individual non-attorney representing it. (See CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146 [A corporation has the capacity to bring a lawsuit because it has all the powers of a natural person in carrying out its business. However, under a long-standing common law rule of procedure, a corporation, unlike a natural person, cannot represent itself before courts of record in propria persona, nor can it represent itself through a corporate officer, director or other employee who is not an attorney. It must be represented by licensed counsel in proceedings before courts of record.].) On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order Prohibiting Defendants from Encumbering/Transferring Real Property, subsequently granted on April 19, 2024. On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff requested default as to Society Ventures, LLC. The Court set an Order to Show Cause (OSC) regarding entry of default on Society Ventures for April 30, 2024. On April 26, 2024, the Court held a hearing on an OSC titled, OSC RE: Why A Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue Cancelling the March 4, 2024 Trustee's Deed Upon Sale In Favor of Defendant Society Ventures, LLC, Recorded Against the Subject Property, Recorded In the Los Angeles County Recorder's Office. There were no appearances. At this hearing, the Court advanced and vacated the OSC regarding entry of default on Society Ventures and continued it to June 24, 2024 at 08:30 AM in Department A14 at Michael Antonovich Antelope Valley Courthouse. The Court gave notice of the change. On May 06, 2024, Shaheed-Edwards filed his Answer. On June 24, 2024, the OSC regarding entry of default on Society Ventures was held. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed its Opposition. On July 02, 2024, Society Ventures filed its Reply. . . .[A]ll reply papers [shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party] at least five court days before the hearing. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b).) Section 1013, which extends the time within which a right may be exercised or an act may be done, does not apply to a notice of motion, papers opposing a motion, or reply papers governed by this section. (Ibid.) The hearing is set for July 09, 2024. July 04, 2024 is a national holiday resulting in court closure. As such, five court days before the hearing is July 01, 2024. A Reply should have been filed by July 01, 2024 to be timely. The Reply is untimely. No paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was untimely submitted for filing. If the court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes or order must so indicate. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1300(d).) The Court, in its discretion, does not consider the late filed Reply. ----- Legal Standard Standard to Quash Service Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 418.10 provides: A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. (2) To stay or dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum. (3) To dismiss the action pursuant to the applicable provisions of Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 583.110) of Title 8. When a defendant challenges the court's personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service. (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403,413; see also Sheard v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 211 [. . .where a defendant properly moves to quash service of summons the burden is on the plaintiff to prove facts requisite to the effective service.].) Chapter 1.5 provides the Court with the discretionary ability to dismiss for delay in prosecution pursuant to this article on its own motion or on motion of the defendant if to do so appears to the court appropriate under the circumstances of the case. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583.410.) ----- Discussion Application The Court notes that there is a Proof of Service that is signed by a registered process server. (See Proof of Substituted Service). This creates a presumption of service. (See Cal. Evid. Code § 647.) Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20, which discusses substituted service provides: (a) In lieu of personal delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to the person to be served as specified in Section 416.10, 416.20, 416.30, 416.40, or 416.50, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual office hours in his or her office or, if no physical address is known, at his or her usual mailing address, other than a United States Postal Service post office box, with the person who is apparently in charge thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. When service is effected by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at a mailing address, it shall be left with a person at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing. (b) If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the persons dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing. (c) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), if the only address reasonably known for the person to be served is a private mailbox obtained through a commercial mail receiving agency, service of process may be effected on the first delivery attempt by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with the commercial mail receiving agency in the manner described in subdivision (d) of Section 17538.5 of the Business and Professions Code. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40, discussing out of state service provides: A summons may be served on a person outside this state in any manner provided by this article or by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt. Service of a summons by this form of mail is deemed complete on the 10th day after such mailing. The Court emphasizes that Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40 allows service on a person outside of this state (1) in any manner provided by this article or (2) by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt. Accordingly, the Court must take into consideration all allowed methods under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 415.10-416.3, which discuss manner of service of summons. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30 allows service by mail in a similar fashion to the second alternative allowed in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40: A summons may be served by mail as provided in this section. A copy of the summons and of the complaint shall be mailed (by first-class mail or airmail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of the notice and acknowledgment provided for in subdivision (b) and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30(a).) Though there are differences between the two Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 415.30 and 415.40, the Court finds case law on Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30 helpful for the issue of whether PO box service is allowed by code: The Judicial Council comment following Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50 states service by mail is not required "where a defendant's whereabouts and his dwelling house or usual place of abode, etc. cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence." (Judicial Council of Cal. com., Deering's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1991 ed.) § 415.50, p. 676.) However, we do not read this comment to exclude service by mail in the instant case. Although respondent could not ascertain appellant's "dwelling house or usual place of abode," we believe the post office box falls into the "etc." category. (See Donel Inc. v. Badalian (1978) 87 Cal. App. 3d 327 [150 Cal. Rptr. 855] [where mailing of summons is reasonably feasible, any method of service less likely to provide actual notice is insufficient]; Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 315-318 [94 L. Ed. 865, 873-876, 70 S. Ct. 652] [for the same proposition]; see also U.S. v. $84,740.00 U.S. Currency (9th Cir. 1990) 900 F.2d 1402 [in addition to service by publication, the government served defendants with a forfeiture complaint by sending two certified letters to defendants' post office box].) Our finding a post office box is a sufficient address for compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 415.30 also is supported by case law interpreting the statutory predecessor to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50. Former Code of Civil Procedure section 413 required "a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited in the post office, directed to the person to be served, at his place of residence. . . ." (Italics added.) At least two courts defined the term "residence" not as the defendant's abode, but rather as "the address at which letters would be most likely to reach the defendant." ( Sousa v. Freitas (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 663 [89 Cal. Rptr. 485]; cf. San Diego Sav. Bank v. Goodsell (1902) 137 Cal. 420, 427 [70 P. 299].) This interpretation of "residence" is relevant to our holding a post office box is a sufficient address for service under Code of Civil Procedure 415.30 because it demonstrates how statutory language and judicial comments should be read to achieve the statute's fundamental objective of serving notice on the defendant. Whenever possible, a statute should be interpreted as broadly as necessary to effectuate the statute's purpose. (See generally, S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc. (9th Cir. 1993) 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 [interpreting language in Securities and Exchange Commision rule 10b-5 as broadly and as flexibly as necessary to accomplish the statute's purpose]; cf. Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 408, 425 [261 Cal. Rptr. 384, 777 P.2d 157] [where a statute has two possible interpretations, courts should apply the more reasonable of the two].) (Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Hendrix (1995) 34 Cal. App. 4th 740, 745-46.) Thus, it appears when taking case law, statute, and the context of the mailed service into consideration, that Plaintiff has not effected service in a way that is authorized by California law. That is, Plaintiff has sent a copy of the summons and of the complaint to Diane Merrit at an address that is not associated with Society Ventures. The address associated with Society Ventures is 3500 Lennox Rd., Atlanta, GA 30326. (See Stewart Decl. 3, Exh. B.) The Court notes that the declaration provided by Jessie Stewart (Stewart), the manager of Society Ventures, states that Diane Merritts only authority was to conduct the trustee sales related to the Subject Property and Diane Merrit has no connection with the 8549 Wilshire Blvd. address other than its association with the one time public/private lien sale pursuant to UCC. (See Stewart Decl. ¿¿ 5-7.) Service on a corporation must be to (1) the person designated as agent for service of process as provided by any provision in Section 202, 1502, 2105, or 2107 of the Corporations Code (or Sections 3301 to 3303, inclusive, or Sections 6500 to 6504, inclusive, of the Corporations Code, as in effect on December 31, 1976, with respect to corporations to which they remain applicable); (2) the president, chief executive officer, or other head of the corporation, a vice president, a secretary or assistant secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a controller or chief financial officer, a general manager, or a person authorized by the corporation to receive service of process.; (3) if the corporation is a bank, to a cashier or assistant cashier or to a person specified in subdivision (a) or (b); and (4) if authorized by any provision in Section 1701, 1702, 2110, or 2111 of the Corporations Code (or Sections 3301 to 3303, inclusive, or Sections 6500 to 6504, inclusive, of the Corporations Code, as in effect on December 31, 1976, with respect to corporations to which they remain applicable), as provided by that provision. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 416.10.) The registered agent for Society Ventures is Stewart. (See Stewart Decl. 3, Exh. B.) Plaintiffs Opposition, including the requests for judicial notice, does not address Society Ventures Georgia address or its agent for service of process on file with Georgias Secretary of State. As such, Plaintiffs Opposition does not affect the Courts analysis. As presented, the Summons and Complaint have been (1) served on an individual that is not authorized to accept service on behalf of Society Ventures in violation of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 416.10; (2) served at an in-state address by mail only in violation of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40. Service; and served at an address that is not associated with Society Ventures. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED. ----- Conclusion Specially appearing defendant Society Ventures, LLCs Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint is GRANTED.

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